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Epistemology is often a problem for libertarianism. Many libertarian texts assume that they need to do 
more than explain and defend the libertarian conjecture. Instead, they try to offer epistemological 
support for it (whether empirically or morally); which falsificationism and, more broadly, critical 
rationalism explains is not possible.1 Moreover, they often mistake this attempt at support for an 
explanation of libertarianism (which ought to include an abstract theory of liberty and how it relates to 
liberty in practice).2 Therefore, when a criticism of falsificationism appears on a libertarian website3 it 
seems useful to reply to it (even though no discussion of libertarianism itself is involved). 
 
It once appeared to the current author that if there is a pons asinorum in epistemology, then maybe it is 
being able to understand falsificationism.4 Even philosophers and logicians sometimes get hold of the 
wrong end of the stick, and then used it to beat off anyone who tries to explain it to them. The brief blog 
called “Why Popper is Wrong on Induction” (the blog) falls into this category. It asserts that Popper’s 
“error turns on viewing falsification and confirmation as all or nothing affairs” and that this is refuted 
by the fact that “no theory is ever so thoroughly falsified that there is no way to rehabilitate it”. This is 
badly to misunderstand falsificationism. First, a summary of what it is might help.  
 
Given that we do not have an all-seeing view of the universe, we cannot in principle perceive the truth 
of universal propositions such as “all swans are white” (where that includes all past, present, and future 
swans anywhere in the universe). Neither could any finite number of observations of white swans (even 
if they could be guaranteed to be accurate, which they cannot) add any strength to the universal theory 
that they are all white: because the observations are a vanishingly5 small number relative to the universal 
theory. Therefore, we cannot even make our theories more probable (except on the basis of assumptions, 
or conjectures, about probability that cannot themselves be shown to be independently probable). 
However, says Popper, nil desperandum. There is a logical asymmetry between verification and 
falsification. We could in principle (although we might always be mistaken) perceive a single non-white 
swan. And if we in fact (as a matter of reality) do so, then that fact would as a logical implication falsify 
the theory that all swans are white. Hence science can test theories but not support them.    
 
Therefore, falsificationism is ultimately about the situational logic of our being finite epistemological 
beings. This argument has to be understood and criticised first (it is not advanced as an axiom or a 
dogma) before we proceed to the obvious next issue: how do we know that the apparent refutation is an 
actual refutation? That too remains a conjecture. We can also test that conjecture, but only by making 
assumptions that we do not attempt to test at the same time. It is the logical possibility of falsification 
that we use, not conclusive falsification. Ultimately, it is ‘conjectures all the way down’ (as opposed to 
turtles). It is possible we are mistaken about any of our theories. But there is no need to fall into complete 
scepticism. Where we ‘know’ things—i.e., are aware of the way the world is—we simply realise that 
 
1 Epistemological ‘supporting justifications’ of theories, observations, and theses face a trilemma: they 
are all based on unsupported assumptions, or conjectures, and any attempt to support those assumptions 
entails infinite regress, or dogmatic assertion, or circularity (none of which can offer support). 
2 For a short introduction to a philosophical theory of libertarianism that relates it to critical rationalism, 
see Lester, J. C. 2021. “Eleutherological Conjecturalist Libertarianism: a Concise Philosophical 
Explanation” (PhilPapers: https://philpapers.org/rec/INDNLA). 
3 Callahan, Gene. 2004. “Why Popper Is Wrong on Induction”, LewRockwell.com 
(http://www.lewrockwell.com/callahan/callahan143.html) 
4 Having read Popper and accepted falsificationism while still a schoolboy, it then seemed for a long 
time to be an epistemological pons asinorum (asses bridge): the first severe test for the inexperienced. 
But it now looks more like it may be the final severe test for the experienced: a pons strutionum (owls 
bridge)? However, maybe it is also harder to accept radical challenges to common sense later in life. 
5 And possibly ‘infinitely small’ relative to most scientific theories.   
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this can only ultimately be by conjecture (although some conjectures are well-tested). And we do not 
have a reason to reject any particular theory unless there is a cogent argument or evidence against it.  
 
We can now return to the blog’s suggestion that, “given an experimental result that apparently refutes 
a theory, one can always change an auxiliary hypothesis instead of the central tenet of the theory, and 
so rescue the theory”. Why should we do that unless we suspect that there is an error in the particular 
“auxiliary hypothesis”? We want to find the truth, and we know that conjecture and testing is the only 
way to proceed. Therefore, we ought to want to find genuine refutations if possible; not avoid them. 
But if we suspect they are not genuine, then it would be folly to accept them. We not only have to test 
our theories, we also have to test (or criticise) our tests. This, and the conjectural nature of all such tests, 
is often overlooked by critics of falsificationism. They often assume that a falsification must be 
confirmed if falsificationism is to operate. No: falsifications remain conjectural. Strictly, it is also an 
error to think that a theory can have a “central tenet”. A theory says what it says; and if any part of the 
theory is false then the overall theory is false. An ‘adjusted’ theory, however similar, is really a new 
theory. 
 
Copernicus had the insight that if “the sphere of the stars was ten times farther from the earth than had 
previously been believed” then the observed lack of parallax is not a problem. This was a good criticism 
of the parallax test of heliocentrism. At the time scientists had no way of knowing how far away the 
stars really were. Therefore, it would have been arbitrary to give priority to the first conjecture as to 
their distance just because it was the first. It is not evasively ad hoc to produce a good criticism of a 
test. Coming up with our best criticisms of all our conjectures, including our conjectured tests, is part 
of the falsificationist method. (And by parallel reasoning there is also nothing anti-falsificationist, as 
the blog goes on to imply there would be, were Copernicus to have “simply moved the stellar sphere 
ten times farther away still” if better instruments still did not detect the change.) Copernicus had shown 
that we have two unfalsified and, at the time, unfalsifiable theories (with respect to their disagreements, 
at least). There is nothing anti-falsificationist about Copernicus’s conjecturing that the heliocentric 
theory was the correct one. And although Copernicus’s theory did not simply knock out Ptolemy’s 
theory by its initial fit with the apparent facts, it is generally acknowledged that it had superior 
explanatory power and overall cohesion. 
 
The blog also holds it to be a problem for “the Popperian” (the falsificationist, at least) that it was only 
after more accurate instruments were able to measure the parallax that “heliocentrism became 
scientific!” Not quite. That is when one aspect became empirically scientific. Both the heliocentric and 
geocentric theories were not testable with respect to their differences. Thus far they were not scientific 
in the empirical sense. But a falsificationist can still say that they were part of ‘science’ more broadly 
conceived to include all the theories about the material world that are as yet, or currently, unfalsifiable 
despite our best efforts to make them so (just as even falsifiable scientific theories have unfalsifiable 
aspects and assumptions). In this way much modern theoretical physics is currently unfalsifiable but is 
unproblematically called ‘science’ nevertheless. 
 
We are then told that it “is true that no theory is ever completely confirmed” and that “each piece of 
evidence supporting the theory raises the degree to which it is confirmed”. But it is not explained how, 
given an infinite theory and finite evidence, it can possibly make any sense whatsoever to suppose that 
a theory could even begin to be confirmed. How is it logically possible? The blog ignores the 
fundamental epistemological arguments; and even ignores the universal scientific theories they are 
primarily about. Instead, it alights on historical examples to illustrate its point. But history is not science: 
history is about unique past events that cannot be replicated as science requires. Nevertheless, 
falsificationism can still be applied to unique past events albeit with more difficulty. 
 
The blog imagines that two historians tell us two different “theories”: “Caesar crossed the Rubicon in a 
deliberate act of defiance of the Roman Senate and constitution” and “King Arthur took on a dozen 
wives in order to cement diplomatic relationships with neighbouring kingdoms”. The blog asserts that 
all a falsificationist can say is that “neither theory has been falsified”. However, as the best evidence 
suggests that King Arthur never existed (and not that “no one is even sure if King Arthur was a real 
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person”), then that would seem to falsify the second theory (although that theory has nothing to do with 
science). Where is the “abundant, indeed, overwhelming evidence that leads us to believe the first 
historian’s theory”? To cut a long story short, how can the appearance of something even before our 
own eyes be any guarantee that it is what it appears to us to be? Even if we test it and can be sure our 
tests are infallible, we have only a finite number of tests of what is implicitly a theory with universal 
aspects—many being counterfactual—despite being an apparent ‘singular observation’. All that said, if 
a theory survives great scrutiny, then it can be a critically-preferred conjecture; rather than, at the other 
extreme, an uninformed, inchoate, and untested conjecture. Consequently, it is a mistake to assert that 
all that can be said of two unfalsified theories is that “neither theory has been falsified”. 
 
Again, how can a scientific theory be “more or less confirmed”? How can “different degrees of belief... 
[be]...scientifically founded” and “different pieces of evidence...offer varying degrees of confirmation 
for a theory”? Belief has nothing to do with science, in any case. Scientific theories can be stated 
objectively and any scientific evidence against them is objective and can be replicated. It is not a 
scientific matter whether anyone believes a theory or with how much psychological certainty. Merely 
invoking the name of “Bayesianism” adds nothing here. The blog’s title cites “induction”, and it 
eventually does reach the subject. But then its entire explanation appears to be as follows: “The 
regularity of physical events, and therefore the ability to induce causes from effects, is not a conclusion 
of the physical sciences, but, rather, a premise of them”. Falsificationists can agree with the conjecture 
that there are some regularities in physical events, but only because immediate observation appears to 
falsify the theory that there are no regularities. And particular regularities appear within particular 
theories as assumptions, i.e., as parts of the theory and not a “premise” of science itself (even if we 
assume that the universe is full of all and only “regularities”, that doesn’t offer any support to theories). 
But what does it even mean to “induce causes from effects”? What is valid “induction”? The blog 
nowhere explains it. By contrast, falsificationism is a definite coherent theory with clear explanatory 
arguments. They are not fiendishly difficult to follow, just somewhat counterintuitive given current 
common sense.  
 
It is confused of the blog to assert that it is Popper’s “situational logic” that has “supposedly demolished 
inductivism”. Induction (the view that finite evidence can somehow support more general theories) had 
long been shown to be a fallacy. David Hume (1711-1776) is the, relatively, modern person who 
rediscovered and emphasised the fallacy (but thought we were stuck with induction as a custom of mind 
and practical necessity). There are similar arguments going back many hundreds of years, most 
famously perhaps to Sextus Empiricus (c. 160–c. 210 CE). What Popper did that was new is explain 
that we still can, and must, use the hypothetico-deductive method instead: conjecturing theories, 
deducing consequences, and testing for them. Hence, we do not need to keep trying to make sense of 
induction. There is no role whatsoever that “induction plays in the physical sciences”.  
 
Let us conclude with the blog’s final point of alleged “logic”: “logic can never be employed to ‘refute’ 
premises: it can only refute the conclusions drawn from them”. It is, in fact, a logical howler to suppose 
that “logic can never be employed to ‘refute’ premises”. If A entails ~A, then the premise A is refuted. 
That is actually a theorem in logic (provable not hypothetically but as necessarily true). And where any 
premise logically entails inconsistent conclusions, that also refutes the premise. That is also a theorem. 
Moreover, we can never use logic to refute conclusions; although we might use it to show that they are 
not entailed. More relevantly here, however, if we state the inductivist assumption as ‘finite evidence 
can support more general theories’, then we can apparently use the same evidence to ‘support’ different 
theories that are inconsistent with each other. And this inconsistency therefore logically refutes the 
inductivist assumption that entails it. 
